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vast imponderable is still present whether the problem be viewed
by seconds, days, or years. Thus a policy objection to the per
diem approach is that it is essentially a trial tactic, which con-
fuses the jury, and at the same time does nothing to assist in
the solution of the actual problem. It is therefore suggested that
per diem arguments should not be permitted when the quantum
for pain and suffering damage is at issue. 17
Walter M. Hunter, Jr.
Liability In Left Turn Collisions'
Louisiana courts are frequently called upon to decide the
issue of liability for damages arising out of automobile collisions
where, at the moment of impact, one of the parties was attempt-
ing to turn to his left. In this Comment, it is sought to derive
the prevailing attitudes of the Louisiana appellate courts con-
cerning what constitutes negligence on the part of the motorist
turning to his left, what constitutes negligence on the part of the
non-turning motorist involved in a left turn collision, and the
interrelationships of their two patterns of conduct in deciding
the issue of liability.
injury or suffering, and the various factors involved are not capable of proof
in dollars and cents. For this reason, the only standard for evaluation is such
amount as reasonable persons estimate to be fair compensation. Botta v. Brunner,
26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
17. As juries are seldom used in Louisiana civil cases, the damage problem
will usually be handled by a judge. Due to the experience of trial judges, per
diem arguments are not as likely to influence their decisions as they would a
juror's. However, it seems that per diem arguments should still be condemned
in Louisiana for the same reasons mentioned in the text. If for no other reason,
such tactics should not be permitted as they do nothing to assist in the solution
of the damage issue, and serve only to delay the trial.
1. As used by the Louisiana courts, the term "left turn" incorporates a va-
riety of maneuvers, in all of which a motorist changes course more or less to his
left. The term is most commonly applied where a motorist turns across the oppo-
site lane of traffic in order to enter an intersecting street or a private drive. How-
ever, the courts also characterize as a left turn such maneuvers as turning onto
a street from a private drive or parking lot with intention to travel in the far
lane. Zurich Fire Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 49 So.2d 460 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
The motorist who turns left across the neutral ground of a boulevard and stops
before crossing the opposite lane is considered to be turning left after having
stopped, even though after stopping he is in the same position as one who crosses
the boulevard on the intersecting street. Wilson v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas.
Co., 275 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Terrell v. Fargason, 67 So.2d 771 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1953). A recent case characterized a motorist as turning left when he
was changing from the right to the left lane of a multiple roadway, preparatory
to making a left turn. Mock v. Savage, 123 So.2d 806 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
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,Motorists Turning Left
The duty of care. All of the recent decisions stress that the
left turn is a highly dangerous maneuver, not to be undertaken
without a very high degree of care.2 Notwithstanding the dan-
gers attendant upon turning left, it remains that every motorist
must frequently execute this basic and essential maneuver. The
Highway Regulatory Act 3 provides that one turning left must
"see that the movement can be made in safety ' 4 without unduly
delaying normal traffic from either direction.5 The proper sig-
nal must be given 6 and one turning left must yield the right-of-
way. 7 He must turn from the lane nearest the centerline in such
a manner as to pass to the right of the centerpoint of the inter-
section." To these, the courts have added a further requirement,
that a left turn signal be given in time for other motorists to
govern their conduct accordingly, 9 the Supreme Court going so
far as to require the turning driver to ascertain that his signal
has actually been heeded.' 0
Presumption of negligence from involvement in collision.
While perhaps the cautious driver should follow most of the
above steps in executing a left turn, it has become most difficult
to convince the Louisiana courts that one has done so, if involved
in a collision. In some instances, the courts have pinpointed spe-
cific infractions of the Highway Regulatory Act as acts of neg-
ligence,1 but in the majority of cases negligence has been speci-
2. Though no court has specifically stated why the turn is so inherently dan-
gerous, anyone who drives can readily appreciate some of the hazards involved.
One driving on a two-lane highway must necessarily assume that oncoming ve-
hicles will not turn across his path without warning. Even if warning is given,
he must necessarily assume that such vehicles will not turn so as to endanger
his safety. Similarly, the overtaking motorist must necessarily rely upon the for-
ward driver not to turn to the left before he has passed in safety.
3. La. Acts 1938, No. 286, incorporated as Title 32 of the Revised Statutes.
This is the basic statute which regulates execution of the left turn. Though there
are concurrent city ordinances, the act is as applicable in metropolitan areas as
on the open highway. Holliday v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 38 So.2d
235 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949).
4. LA. R.S. 32:236(A) (1950).
5. Id. 32:235(A). This section specifically refers to vehicles "turning around"
upon the highway, presumably executing a "U-turn," but it is uniformly considered
as regulating right angle left turns as well.
6. Id. 32:236.
7. Id. 32:235(A).
8. Id. 32:235(B),
9. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Crow, 86 So.2d 212 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956)
Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Lumberman's Mutual Cas. Co., 85 So.2d 87 (La. App. 1st
Cir 1955).
10. Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Firemen's Insurance Co., 232 La.
379, 94 So.2d 295 (1957).
11. E.g., failure to render a proper signal as required by LA. R.S. 32:236(B)
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fied simply as a breach of the duty to "see that the movement is
made in safety."'12 Though this statutory language could be con-
strued merely as requiring a careful lookout, the courts have as-
signed an interpretation making it incumbent upon the motorist
turning left virtually to "see to it" that his turn is made in safe-
ty.1" If not negligence per se,'14 involvement in a collision while
turning left at least gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of
negligence. 15 In one case a court went so far as to indicate that
a plaintiff motorist turning left is required to absolve himself of
negligence as a requisite to making out his case against the de-
fendant non-turning driver. 6
Non-Turning Motorists
In the majority of reported cases, the motorist turning left
has collided either with a vehicle approaching from the opposite
(1950). De Ia Vergne v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 4 So.2d 66 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1941) ; Slocum v. Hawn, 155 So. 24 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934). Mere
blinking of the brake lights does not suffice. Parker v. Home Indemnity Co., 41
So.2d 783 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949). Nor does a hurried dropping of the hand out
the window. Martin v. Globe Indemnity Co., 64 So.2d 257 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1953).
12. LA. R.S. 32:236(A) (1950) ; Holden v. Rester, 66 So.2d 366 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1953) ; Lane v. Bourgeois, 28 So.2d 91 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946) ; Home
Ins. Co. v. Warren, 29 So.2d 551 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947) ; Harris v. Bigby, 29
So.2d 805 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947).
13. See Cassar v. Mansfield Lumber Co., 35 So.2d 797 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1948), overruled on another point, 215 La. 533, 41 So.2d 209 (1949) ; Owen v.
0. K. Storage & Transfer Co., 10 So.2d 649 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942) ; Parker
v. Employers' Casualty Co., 152 So. 373 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
14. Day v. Roberts, 55 So.2d 316, 318 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951) : "In the event
that he [the motorist turning left] collides with traffic from either direction while
attempting to make a left turn, he is guilty of negligence." (Emphasis added.)
This result has been questioned. "We very much fear that our courts may have
been guilty of some overemphasis in the establishment and reiteration of this rule,
which has resulted in the assumption that the driver of a vehicle who under-
takes a left hand turn is guilty of negligence, per se, in the event an accident
occurs. Certainly, this result was never intended." Paggett v. Travelers Indem-
nity Co., 99 So.2d 173, 176 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957).
15. Codifer v. Occhipinti, 57 So.2d 697, 699 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1952) is most
frequently cited for this proposition: "The State Highway Regulatory Law .. .
makes it clear that a driver attempting to turn to his left on a public highway
must make certain that it is safe to do so. When such a left hand turn is being
made and an accident occurs, the burden rests heavily on the driver who is making
the left-hand turn to explain how the accident occurred and to show that he was
free from negligence." Cited with approval in Wilson v. Southern Farm Bureau
Cas. Co., 275 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Capone v. Cotton Trade Warehouses, 215
La. 692, 41 So.2d 505 (1949). See also Strug v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 53
So.2d 437 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) ; Sumrall v. Myles, 51 So.2d 411 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1951).16. Castille v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 92 So.2d 137 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1957). Such is contrary to the fundamental principle that contributory negligence
is a defense, the burden of proving plaintiff's negligence resting upon the de-
fendant.
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direction or with a vehicle in the process of attempting to over-
take him as he is turning. 7
The standard of care. To the motorist turning left, a motor-
ist approaching from the opposite direction owes a duty of main-
taining a reasonable lookout,' though it is sometimes indicated
in the decisions that he may presume that the right-of-way will
be accorded to him. 19 By comparison, the overtaking motorist
owes, to the motorist turning left, a more onerous duty. The
Highway Regulatory Act requires that he indicate his intention
to pass by sounding his horn 20 after ascertaining that the left
lane is clear 21 and that he not attempt to pass at an intersection,
identifiable as such.22
Contributory negligence. From the above, it would appear
that each motorist involved in a left turn collision owes to the
other some obligation of care and that neither bears the entire
responsibility for the other's safety. Be that as it may, the
courts ordinarily find the motorist turning left to have been neg-
ligent, while they seem reluctant to find negligence on the part
of the non-turning motorist.23 It is suggested that this result
stems, in part, from judicial reluctance to apply the doctrine of
contributory negligence to bar recovery by a party whose duty
of care is lesser by comparison. Strictly applied, the doctrine of
contributory negligence would bar recovery by a plaintiff whose
17. Because only a handful of left turn cases involve other factual patterns,
this Comment is limited to a consideration of only these two.
18. Samples v. Strait, 36 So.2d 856 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948) ; Deffez v.
Stephens, 30 So.2d 154 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947) ; Shirley v. Caldwell Bros. &
Hart, 183 So. 581 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938).
19. Sullivan v. Locke, 73 So.2d 616 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954); Michelli v.
itheem Mfg. Co., 34 So.2d 264 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1948) ; Gaines v. Standard
Accident Ins. Co., 32 So.2d 633 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947). In the Sullivan and
Michelli cases, supra, it was held that, at a controlled intersection, the driver not
turning is not negligent in failing to note the presence of another vehicle turning
left in front of Lim while he is proceeding with the right of way under a favorable
light.
20. LA. R.S. 32:233(B), (C) (1950).
21. Id. 32:233(A).
22. Id. 32:233(E). In Holden v. Rester, 66 So.2d 366 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1953), the motorist turning left was held to a duty to anticipate the possibility
that reduction of speed by the car preceding him might indicate an intention to
turn left.
23. In the following cases, the non-turning driver was -barred by his contribu-
tory negligence: Hollabaugh-Seale Funeral Home v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 215
La. 545, 41 So.2d 212 (1949) ; Allstate Insurance Co. v. Employers' Liability
Assurance Corp., 98 So.2d 852 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957) ; Callia v. Rambin, 78
So.2d 44 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955) ; Sullivan v. Locke, 73 So.2d 616 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1954) ; Owen v. 0. K. Storage & Transfer Co., 10 So.2d 649 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1942); Drake v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 194 So. 70 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1940).
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own negligence, even if slight by comparison with that of de-
fendant, was a contributing cause of his injury.24 Thus an over-
taking motorist who neglects to sound his horn, or an approach-
ing motorist who is somewhat lax in keeping a lookout ahead,
would be precluded from recovery. Because the courts place
higher responsibility for mutual safety on the motorist turning
left, they seem reluctant to lift the burden of liability from his
shoulders merely on a showing that the other driver has violated
some traffic regulation. This is not to say, however, that the
non-turning motorist always escapes a finding of negligence.
Perhaps minimizing the negligence of the non-turning mo-
torist is warranted in the meeting situation where the turning
vehicle suddenly obstructs the opposite lane without warning.
However, it would seem that this tendency would be less war-
ranted in the overtaking situation where both motorists are at-
tempting dangerous maneuvers on the left side of the highway.
The Highway Regulatory Act provides that when an overtaking
vehicle collides with another, "the responsibility shall rest prima
facie on the driver of the vehicle doing the overtaking. ' ' 25 It is
noteworthy that this presumption has been rarely applied by
the courts of appeal where the overtaking motorist collides with
another turning left.26 However, in the recent case of Thomas v.
Barrett,27 the Supreme Court employed this statutory presump-
tion to defeat recovery by an overtaking motorist injured in a
collision with the overtaken motorist who was turning left at the
time. The court held that the plaintiff was negligent in not in-
suring his safe passage around defendant's truck, while the de-
fendant was negligent in not determining that his way was clear
to turn left. In essence, this decision says that since each owed
to the other a duty of not becoming involved in a collision,
neither can recover for his injuries. It is submitted that this is
an unfortunate result. It is presumed that a motorist involved
in a collision while turning left is negligent, that his judgment
that the movement could be made in safety was erroneous, and
that this error in judgment was unreasonable. By employing a
statute, the Supreme Court has applied the same principle to the
24. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 22.1 et seq. (1956).
25. LA. R.S. 32:233(C) (1950).
26. In one case the statutory presumption applied against an overtaking mo-
torist involved in a left turn collision, and in that instance he had attempted to
pass at an intersection. Greengus v. Manufacturing Cas. Ins. Co., 71 So.2d 611
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1954).
27. 240 La. 363, 123 So.2d 87 (1960).
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overtaking motorist. Thus where the two collide, the result is a
stalemate. Certainly it is possible that the accident could be
caused by only one having made an error in judgment; further,
it is possible that though each erred in thinking his maneuver
could be made safely, only one was unreasonable in so conclud-
ing. It is submitted that to generalize mutual fault from the
types of maneuvers undertaken and so preclude recovery by
either motorist is to find negligence and contributory negligence
on an insubstantial basis. It is suggested that even if both are
presumed negligent, each should be allowed to rebut this pre-
sumption by showing either that he did not err in judgment or
if there was error, that it was not unreasonable.
Perhaps underlying the Thomas case was the fact that the
testimony was in hopeless dispute and therefore the court was
unwilling to shift the burden of liability to the defendant on the
basis of the plaintiff's evidence. If this is so, then perhaps the
door remains open in future cases involving collisions between
overtaking motorists and overtaken motorists turning left, to
rebut the presumptions arising from the circumstances of the
collision by introducing persuasive evidence of the other's want
of care or of his own exercise of reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances. Apparently, this position has been taken by sub-
sequent cases in the courts of appeal.2
8
There is a further reason why this decision is unfortunate.
It is likely that the presumption of fault on the part of the over-
taking motorist was not intended to apply in left turn collisions,
but to attach primarily where an overtaking motorist has col-
lided head-on with an oncoming vehicle. On the other hand, it
is probable that the statutory prohibition against passing at
intersections was designed, in part, to reduce collisions between
overtaking vehicles and those being overtaken while in the proc-
ess of turning left. This is the view the courts of appeal have
generally taken and, in spite of the onerous duty placed upon
the motorist turning left, the motorist who attempts to overtake
28. In North River Insurance Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 132 So.2d 90
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1961), the plaintiff-overtaking motorist was able to recover by
proving that the motorist turning left had attempted to turn knowing that the
plaintiff was only one car-length behind him in the left lane. In two cases de-
cided subsequent to Thomas v. Barrett, courts of appeal have awarded recovery
to the overtaking motorist without adverting to that case: Ruple v. Traveler's
Indemnity Co., 129 So.2d 240 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; Hornosky v. United Gas
Pipeline Co., 127 So.2d 287 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
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him at an intersection is usually found to have himself been
negligent.29
Last clear chance. The doctrine of last clear chance - said
to have developed out of judicial distaste for strict application
of the doctrine of contributory negligence30 - holds that where
an accident happens through the combined negligence of two
persons, he alone is liable to the other who had the last oppor-
tunity to avoid the accident.31 As applied in Louisiana the doc-
trine has posed yet another obstacle in the path of the motorist
turning left seeking to escape liability. In the reported cases the
courts have not permitted him to invoke last clear chance but
have permitted it to be used against him. As plaintiff, he has
sought to employ the doctrine by urging that in spite of his con-
tributory negligence in failing to "see that his turn is made in
safety," the overtaking motorist had the last opportunity to
avoid the collision by turning hard right and passing to plain-
tiff's rear.3 2 This argument has been dismissed with the obser-
vation that the overtaking motorist faced with a "sudden emer-
gency" created by plaintiff's obstructing the highway in front
of him is not to be held to the standard of ordinary care under
the circumstances .
3
Last clear chance has been urged successfully by the over-
taking motorist. The doctrine has been recognized as applicable
in Louisiana where a plaintiff is shown to have been in helpless
peril and the defendant actually "discovered the peril" in time
to avoid the accident by proper care. Thus in Cassar v. Mans-
29. Cassar v. Mansfield Lumber Co., 215 La. 533, 41 So.2d 209 (1949) ; Hol-
labaugh-Seale Funeral Home v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 215 La. 545, 41 So.2d
212 (1949) ; Nichols v. Everist, 80 So.2d 199 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955) ; Callia v.
Rambin, 78 So.2d 44 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955) ; Greengus v. Manufacturing Cas.
Ins. Co., 71 So.2d 611 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954). Overtaking motorist has been
held contributorily negligent where passing on a hill in violation of LA. R.S.
32:233(0) (1950), where he collided with motorist turning left at its crest, Sum-
rall v. Myles, 51 So.2d 411 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).
30. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 22.3 (1956).
31. SALMOND, TORTS 525 (11th ed. 1953).
32. Martin v. Globe Indemnity Co., 64 So.2d 257 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953);
Harris v. Bigby, 29 So.2d 805 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947). The "sudden emergency"
doctrine has also been applied in meeting situations so as not to require ordinary
care of the non-turning motorist where contributory negligence is alleged, making
it unnecessary for the plaintiff non-turning motorist to utilize the doctrine of last
clear chance: Tally v. Howard, 65 So.2d 395 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953) ; Myers v.
Maricelli, 50 So.2d 312 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) ; Fidelity & Guaranty Fire Corp.
v. Ritter, 37 So.2d 349 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948) ; Home Ins. Co. v. Warren, 29
So.2d 551 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947).
33. See note 30 supra.
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field Lumber Co.,3 4 a collision ensued when plaintiff sought to
overtake defendant at an intersection just as defendant com-
menced a left turn. The defendant had seen the overtaking ve-
hicle in his rear-view mirror but thought he could clear the in-
tersection in time to avoid a collision. The Supreme Court
viewed the plaintiff-overtaking motorist as having been in help-
less peril due to his own negligence in passing at the intersec-
tion. The court found, however, that the defendant had had the
last opportunity to avoid the accident by "restraining his im-
pulse to turn" and that failure to do so constituted failure to
take the last clear chance. Therefore, he was held liable even
though the overtaking motorist was clearly contributorily neg-
ligent.
Under the doctrine of "unconscious" last clear chance as
recognized in some jurisdictions, a plaintiff, himself contribu-
torily negligent, may nevertheless recover from a defendant who
did not actually discover plaintiff's peril but who, with proper
vigilance, should have discovered it in time to avoid the harm. 5
In Hollabaugh-Seale Funeral Home v. Standard Accident Insur-
ance Co., 36 the Supreme Court declined to apply the doctrine of
"unconscious" last clear chance where defendant, turning left,
had not seen the plaintiff overtaking him because of failure to
look in his rear-view mirror. The court there expressly limited
the doctrine of last clear chance to instances where the motorist
turning left has actually "discovered the peril" of the overtaking
motorist.
There does not seem to be a compelling reason why, in a torts
scheme based on fault, the driver heavily charged with responsi-
bility for safe execution of a left turn is any more culpable in
erroneously estimating his chances of clearing an intersection
knowing that another is attempting to overtake him, than is the
motorist who attempts to turn left without looking to the rear at
all. It is submitted that, at least for the sake of consistency, the
doctrine of "unconscious" last clear chance should be applied to
impose liability on the motorist who turns without taking pre-
cautions if it is to be applied to the motorist who takes precau-
tions but makes an error in judgment.
The non-turning motorist - conduct bordering on wilful and
34. 215 La. 533, 41 So.2d 209 (1949).
35. See PROSS R, TORTS § 52 (2d ed. 1955).
36. 215 La. 545, 41 So.2d 212 (1949).
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wanton indifference to the safety of others. The courts seem
less ready to minimize contributory negligence where it is shown
that the non-turning motorist has exhibited indifference towards
the safety of others. Thus contributory negligence has been
found where, just prior to the collision, the non-turning motorist
was looking to the rear waving at a pedestrian and where he
was grossly exceeding a municipal speed limit.38
Conclusions
The Louisiana courts, viewing the left turn as a highly dan-
gerous maneuver, have placed a high degree of responsibility
upon a motorist turning left to "see to it" that his turn is safely
made. So onerous is this standard of care that involvement in
a collision while turning left gives rise to a presumption of fault.
In absence of a showing that the conduct of the non-turning mo-
torist bordered on "wilful and wanton" indifference to the safety
of others, the courts tend to minimize negligence on the part of
the non-turning driver except where he was attempting to over-
take at an intersection. Even then, the doctrine of last clear
chance may be available to him.
It is suggested that this approach towards left turn collisions
has developed because it is rather simple to administer and be-
cause in most cases it seems to do justice between the parties.
Evident, however, is a judicial distaste for the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery by a plaintiff-
non-turning motorist whose standard of care is rather slight as
compared to the motorist turning left. Perhaps the courts would
prefer to compare negligence and reduce plaintiff's damages
accordingly, 39 but such is not permissible so long as the strict
doctrine of contributory negligence remains a part of Louisiana
law.
Gerald Le Van
Rights and Duties of Riders in Private Automobiles
The development of the automobile industry has not only
revolutionalized transportation, but has brought about develop-
37. Massicot v. Nolan, 65 So.2d 648 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953).
38. Short v. Baton Rouge, 110 So.2d 825 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959); Hardin
v. Yellow Cab Co., 38 So.2d 814 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949).
39. See Malone, Comparative Negligence -Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage,
6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 125 (1945).
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